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International labour standards and 
the review of industrial law 
Gordon Anderson* 
This papere.xanzines rhe nzajor!LO conl'enrions that ha\'e a direct bearing on industrial relations 
structures. After a brief exan1inarion (~(the purposes of fLO standards the New Zealand go\'enunent's 
approach ro ratification is considered. The paper then looks at the n1ajor con "entions pointing out the 
difficulties in inzplenzenting the111 and considering what changes would he needed to /'olew Zealand 
law to achieve this. The policy and practical inlplicarions of such changes are also discussed.· 
Introduction 
Since 1919. the n1ajor source of in tern at ional labour standards has been the conventions 
and recon1n1endations of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) together with the 
interpretative rulings issued by the supervisory bodies established by that organisation. 
Indeed so ignificant is this body of international standards that it i often referred to as an 
international lahour code (Valticos. 1979 p. 46). These standards have also been cornpli-
mented by instrurnents adopted by other international agencies. notably the United Nations.' 
but also regional agencies such as the Council of Europe and the League of Arah States. 
The ILO conventions are. however. the tnost itnportant of these instruments because of 
their world wide application. their sok focus on labour and industrial relations and because 
they are adopted in the expectation that they will influence the law and ptactice of n1ernber 
countries to conforn1 to the standards set. The ILO is unique in several aspects. Arnong 
international organisations the 1LO alone is a tripartite organisation and thus its deci ~ions 
represent not only the position of governrnents but also of en1p1oyer and worker delegates. 
Valticos (1979. p.?9) suggests that the tripartite structure .. has heen an undeniable source of 
vigour··. it avoids decision being taken in a purely technocratic spirit and give~ increased 
authority to ILO decisions. 
Since 1919. the IL~O had adopted 161 conventions although a reasonable proportion of 
these are revisions of earlier conventions.2 Of these. New Zealand has ratified 5i' although ) 
of these have been recently denounced. This nun1ber of ratifications is reasonably high and 
cornpares favourably with an average of 56 ratifications for V..'e t European countries. 
The nature of and obligation of lLO standards"' 
• 
I 
ILO standards take the forn1 of either conventions or recornmendations. Conventions are 
Senior Lecturer. Department of A~countancy. Victoria University of Wellington. 
e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): International Covenants on Economic. Social 
and Cultu ra I Rights ( 1966) and the I nternationa I Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 1966). 
2 Vahicos ( 1979. pp. 58-59) ~tated that. in 1978.40 had been formally revised and llnother 3 had been 
supplanted by later Conventions. Since 197R at least2 conventions ~eem to have been revisionary in 
character. 
3 Department ofLahou r ( 1982). Si nee 1982 Conventions 100 and lll have been ratified . The dcnou need 
Conventions an: 1 1 and R9. 
4. Valticos { 1979) provides a detailed treatment of all aspe~ts of intcrnationnl l~lhour law. 
I 
28 Gordon Anderson 
the n1ore significant of these as they are intended to be formally ratified by member countries. 
such countries then assurning formal responsibilities to ensure that national law and practice 
confirn1s to the convention. To attain the maximum number of ratifications. conventions 
generally impose only broad n1inimum standards and attempt to achieve maximum 
flexibility so as to n1eet the different social and economic conditions in member countries. 
Recommendations. on the other hand. are intended only as a guide to practice and policy and 
do not involve forn1allegal obligations. There are 166 recommendations at present. For this 
reason they can be used for a variety of purposes for which a convention may not be suitable. 
These include providing more detailed and higher standards than may be possible in a 
convention or providing standards in an area where a convention is not presently possible. 
In the case of both conventions and recommendations. member governments of the ILO 
have an obligation to place the instruments before the competent authority (in New Zealand 
this is Parlian1ent) and to state the action they propose to take in respect of the instrument. 
Such action must also be notified to the Director-General of the ILO. New Zealand 
governments perfonn this requirement through Parliamentary Papers A7 and A7 A. Member 
countries are also obliged to supply reports on unratified conventions and on recommenda-
tions when required. Generally. the ILO Governing Body requires reports on one or more 
instruments each year. These reports are examined by supervisory bodies. 
Ratification of a convention. however. is a formal act by which a state assumes specific 
legal obligations in respect of the convention. most important of which is the obligation to 
take such action as n1ay he necessary to make the provisions of the convention effective. 
Generally these measures are permitted to be flexible and include collective bargaining or 
similar rneasures in addition to legislative action. Once ratified. a convention comes into force 
after 12 months and n1ay only be denounced after a period of 10 years and thereafter only at 
the end of subsequent I 0-yearly periods. Ratification also involves the acceptance of an 
obligation to provide periodic reports on the measures taken to give effect to the convention 
and of the possibility of having to answer complaints regarding its observance of a 
convention . The major supervisory body. the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations. consists of persons appointed in their personal capacity 
and is independent of governments. Freedom of association complaints are dealt with by a 
separate body. the Committee on Freedom of Association. The decisions of these bodies 
represent a significant body of law on the application and interpretation of the various 
conventions. 
• 
It should also he noted that. unlike many international instruments. an ILO convention·s 
ratification cannot he n1ade subject to reservations. Consequently ratification may be made 
more difficult as particular articles which cause problems cannot he avoided even for 
legitimate reasons. 
The New Zealand approach to ratification 
The official New Zealand arproach to ratifying ILO conventions has often been stated in 
its reports on proposed action: This is: .. Because of the obligations incumbent on ratifying 
countries. New Zealand ratifies a convention only when there is strict compliance of law and 
practice with all the provisions of the particular Convention ... This approach does. however. 
cause some problems because of the manner in which compliance with a convention is 
pern1itted. An art ide such as: .. Effect may he given to this Convention through national laws 
or regulations or collective agreements. or in any other manner consistent with national 
practice .. (Convention 135. Article 6) is typical ofiLO con'fentions. The dilemma is. of course. 
that irnplen1cntation by voluntary procedures such as collective bargaining means that it is 
difficult for a n1en1her state to ensure total compliance. But it is also inconsistent with a system 
of collective bargaining for the governn1ent to dictate the terms of a collective agreement. 
That the New Zealand government is aware of this problem can be seen in its response to 
Convention 144 (on tripartite consultation to pron1ote the implementation ofiLO standards) 
- a rnost appropriate context in which to make the remarks. The response included the 
sta tenH?n t that: 
5. In Parliamcntal)' Papers A7 and A7A in the Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives (AJHR). 
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Nev. Zealand has ~tated in comments to the ILO that it is con~itkred that the subject 
ma ttcr is not one'' h ich is su itcd to an i nst rumen 1 in the form of a Con vent ion. si nee in our 
view a Convention is appropriate for topics which require the enactment of lcgblation or 
Gov~rnmcnl dir~ction or supervision. \Ve believe that this particular matter i one in which 
co-ope1ation from employers· and worker· organisations cannot be cnfon:ed. but is to be 
given voluntarily. and therefore cannot be ensured through legislative or other directive 
measures. As ,com pi iH nee \\it h the Convent ion would he dependent u pan such co-
operation. compliance also cannot he ensured. (AJHR 1975. Paper A7A. p.4). 
Thi approach to ratification would scern to tnean lhal New Zealand n1ay he unable to 
ratify a convention that requires tripartite co-operation unless univer al or virtually universal 
agreetnent can be achieved. One consequence is likely to be that only technical conventions 
\Viii be ratified as norrnaHy they can be irnplen1ented hy governn1ent action alone. Those 
cotnentions that have broader in1plications and affect the indu trial relations systern 
generally are n1ore likely to require tripartite co-operalion and consequently will not be 
ratified. The conventions to be discussed in this paper are altnost all of this type in that they lay 
down basic principles of industrial relations conduct and their effectivenes - depends on 
tripartite in1plen1entation. 
The New Zealand goven11nent approach is. it can he suggested. unduly conservntive. The 
ILO constitution docs not require conforrnity prior to ratification and the ver)' nature of ILO 
conventions envisages impkrnentation hy rneans other than government action. Ohviously 
ratification where in1ple1nentation i unlikely. is not desirable. but in the case of conventions 
to be in1plen1ented by non-governrnental 1neasures. ratification should be acceptable where 
there is substantial cornpliance. Indeed ratification in such cases should help ensure full 
con1pliance especially if the decision to ratify is taken afler consultation an1ong all 3 parties. 
Moreover. given the tripartite n1e1nber hip oft he ILO. it can he strongly argued lhat there is an 
obligation on both employers and unions to take positive steps to enable ralification. To do 
otherwise is to avoid respon ~ jbility and to undermine the ILO systen1 of tripartite decision 
making. 
While ratification does not directly affect don1estic law. ·which rnust he changed through 
norn1al processes. it n1ay have an inlluence on judicial decisions. Cooke. J in Van Gorkon v 
Artorney Gl!nera/11977] in relation to the United Nations l)eclaration of Hun1an Rights. said 
.. They rnay he regarded as reprcscn ti ng a kgisla ti ve policy urh ich 111 igh tin n uencc the courts in 
the in te rprcta tion of statute h1 w:· 
his suggested here that the Governn1ent should revie\v its policy towards ratification to see 
if it is po sible to ratify the major h u nHt n rights and indus tria 1 relet tions conventions without 
the need for prior tot a I corn pi ia nee. 
~Conventions relevant to the Green Paper 
ILO conventions cover a rnultiplicity of subjects. n1any either technical or confined to 
specific classes of worker. Only a limited nurnber atte1npt to lay clown general standards for 
the conduct of industrial relations and the rights and obligations of unions and en1ployers . 
The most irnportant of these which relate to the Green Paper(which cover only private sector 
arrangen1ents) are: 
( l) Convention 87 : freedon1 of association and protection of the right to organise ( 1948) 
(2} Convention 98: applicability of the principles of the right to organise and to hargain 
collectively ( 1949) 
(3) Convention 135: protection and facilities lo he afforded to workers repre entatives in the 
undertaking ( 1971) 
(4) Convention 154: pron1otion of collective bargaining (1981). 
While these conventions have the broadest in1pliction ~.there are other conventions that 
arc relevant to the Green Paper's review uch as Convention 158 on tern1i nation of 
en1ployn1ent at the initialive of the en1ployer (19R2). \vhich should also be considered by 
goven11nent and others. New Zealand has not ratified any of the above conventions. 
The following discussion relates only to the conventions as they apply to private sector 
arrangements and it does not extend to the rccornn1endations that accon1pany Conventions 
135 and 154. Should it be decided that rnore po~itive steps he taken to irnplen1ent the ILO 
standards hoth these rnatters would require attention. l'v1oreover the discussion focuses only 
on the rna in features of the conventions and the prohlcn1s theiritnpk1ncntation would pose. A 
• 
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detailed discussion would be both complex and beyond the scope of this paper which is 
concerned to highlight the problems. not to resolve them in detail. 
Freedom of Association (Convention 87) 
Convention R7 is one of the most important of the ILO conventions. It seeks to apply a 
basic human right and a right central to the constitution of the ILO. The principle was 
adopted in the original 1919 constitution and affirmed in the Declaration of Philadeplhia 
1944. Indeed ILO n1en1bership requires adherence to the principle of freedom of association 
even if Convention 87 has not been ratified. Convention R7 is the only I of the 4 conventions 
covering basic human rights that New Zealand has not ratified.(, 
The failure to ratify Convention 87 relates mainly to the protected position given to 
unions' under the industrial conciliation and arbitration system. The then Ministeroflabour 
(Hon . J Bolger) speaking to the ILO in 1983 said: .. Because of the protective nature of our 
industrial law New Zealand has yet to ratify the Freedom of Association Convention .. (AJHR 
19 Paper A7 p.R). The Green Paper does. however. indicate that a movement towards 
conforn1ity with Convention 87 is envisaged. (Department of Labour. 1985 II p. 276). Such a 
move seen1s to he somewhat hesitant as the words .. where reasonable .. are used. but it is 
nevertheless to he welcomed. While it would be untrue to argue that the failure to ratify is due 
to a lack of acceptance of the convention ·s principles. the failure to ratify does allow the 
conventions principles to he avoided if convenient for political motives. The Green Paper 
points out that the failure to ratify meant that no action could be taken in respect of a 
corn plaint upheld by the Con1mittee on Freedom of Association relating to the provisions of 
the Fishing Industry (Union Coverage) Act 1979 (Department of Labour. 1985 I p. 38-39). 
That the present Governn1ent is totally committed to the convention may also be doubted if 
deregistration threats are made seriously.x 
Convention R7 has received n1uch attention in New Zealand during the debate on union 
n1ernhership. a topic that is excluded from the review in any meaningful sense (Department of 
Labour. 19R4. I p. 11-12). Union security clauses are. however. not the central feature of 
Convention X7. and its in1plen1entation raises much wider issues (see Anderson and Brosnan. 
19X4 ). 
In sun1n1ary Convention X7 guarantees 4 basic freedon1s to workers and employers. These 
are: • 
(I) .. the right to establish and. subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned. to join 
organisations of their own choosing .. (Article 2). 
(2) .. the right to draw up their constitutions and rules. to elect their representatives in full 
freedom. to organise their administration and activities and to formulate their pro-
grammes .. (Article 3( I ). ) 
(3) .. that their organisations shall not he liable to be dissolved or suspended by administra-
tive authority .. (Article 4). 
(4) .. the right to establish and join federations and confederations and the right to affiliate 
with i nterna tion al organisations .. (Article 5 ). 
The convention also prohibits interference with these freedoms by the public authorities. In 
addition to the convention itself. the main source of guidance on the application of the 
convention are the decisions oft he Committee on Freedom of Association ( .. the Committee .. )" 
The right to organise 
The right to organise requires that workers should be able to establish and join 
organisations of their own choosing. This choice may. in practice. be restricted by the unions 
themselves but what is important is that it must not be restricted by the state. either directly or 
tl The others relate to forl·cd labour (No's 29 and 105) and discrimination (No. Ill). 
7 While the discussion in this part centres on unions much of it also applies to employer bodies. 
S Sec the comments by the Minister of Civil Aviation in The Dominion. Friday. March 16th. 1985. p. I. 
9 The Cornmittee·s decisions are summarised in ILO. 1976. References to decisions refer to the 
paragraphs of this publication. 
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through state-in1posed n1onopolies (para. 16). lt follow that the systcn1 of n1onopoly 
registration in the Industrial Relations Act is contrary to Article 2 in that it is the state and not 
the union n1ovcJnent itself that defines the structure of the union moven1ent. This seen1s to 
have been adtnitted by the govcrn1nent in reports to the IL() (ILO. 1973. p. 80). 'The fact that it 
is legally possihk for a union to he fonnec..l and operate outside the provisions of the Industrial 
Relations Act (for ex a n1 p le. urHlcr t h l: I nco rpora ted Societ ics Act) would not see In to alter this 
basic point as registration gives exclusive and unchallengable access to the whole of the 
conciliation and arbitration systern. Unregistered unions rnay have sorne access to the ~ysten1 
but only in situations where no registered union exists. 
An ILO Conu11 ittee of Experts has con1n1ented on this situation as follows: 
... where the rights conferred on a registered trade union under an optional system are of 
uch fundamental importance that any organisation deprived of them would have serious 
difficulty in furthering and defending the interesb of its members. the considerations . .. 
concerning the right to establi h organisations "without previous authorisation .. are as 
relevant as in cases in which registration or other formalities are compul ory. (ILO. 1975. 
p.12) 
Any move to ratification rnust. it seen1s. resu lt in a tnajor cha nge in the protected status of 
registered unions. This need not. however. involve a policy of total access to the conciliation 
and arbitration systen1. The Con11nittee has accepted the notion of a .. n1ost representative .. 
union as long as this does not deprive other union ~ of the .. essential n1eans .. of their 
functioning. The Cornmittee's position .is that: 
Anicle 3. paragraph 5. of the Con titution of the ILO states the concepts of "mo~t 
rcpresenative" organisations. Accordingly the Committee felt that the mere fact that the law 
of a country draw~ a distinction between the most representative trade union organisations 
and other trade union organi at ion · is not in itself a matter forcritici~m. provided that such 
distinction does not accord to the most representative organisation privileges extending 
beyond the privilege of priority. on the ground of its having the largest memher hip. in 
representation for such purpose~ as collective bargaining or con ultation hy go\ernments 
or for the purpose of nominating dekgates to international bodies. In other words. thi~ 
distinction should not have the effect of depriving trade union organisations not rccogni~cd 
as heing among the most rt>presentative oft he essential mc<111:-. \\hereby they may defend the 
occupational intere ts of their members. organise their admini~tration and activitie~ and 
formulate their programmes. as provided for in Convention No. S7 (para. ~9). 
That provisions n1ay exist to prevent a n1ultiplicity of trade unions has also been 
recognised hy the ILO Con1111inee of Experts (ILO. 1975. p. 17). Again the need for objective 
criteria to detenn i ne the 111ajori ty union is stressed as is the need to penni t at least rn in i n1 al 
talus to other unions. 
For New Zealand law to n1eet this interpretation it would seen1 that at least the following 
changes would be required: 
(l) The provisions relating to the legal personality of unions and their constitution needs to 
be separated fron1 the provisions relating to access to the conciliation and arbitration 
syste n1 . 
(2) The criteria for access and the extent of the privileges granted need to be redefined in 
tenns of a n1ost representative union rather than the present systen1 of the lirst union to 
register gaining virtually unchallengeable privileges. 
This can best be achieved by a separate statute (e.g. a new Trade Unions Act) or by a new part 
of the 1 ndustrial Relations Act \Vh ich would he appropriate for the incorporation of all unions 
and which was drafted \\'ith unions specifically in mind. Such an approach \\'ould also enable 
a simple solution to problems posed by Articles 3 - 5 of the convention to be achieved (see 
belO\\'). 
Such a provision need cover only the incorporation and constitutional requircn1ents of 
unions. That is corporate status. powers and any necessary requiretnents relating to internal 
governn1ent and n1anagen1etH that arc con1patible with the convention. 
The nature of a n1ost representative union has been considered by the Co1ntnittee which 
has suggested a nun1ber of safeguards (para. 30). These are: 
(l) certification to be by an independent body. 
' 
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(2) the representative organisation to be chosen by a majority vote of the employees in the 
unit concerned. 
(3) the right of an organisation which fails to secure sufficient votes to ask for a new election 
after a stipulated period. 
(4) the right of an organisation other than the certified organisation to demand a new 
election after a fixed period. 
These safeguards are not exhaustive but are a suggested minimum. It should also be noted 
that the Committee does not define the appropriate bargaining unit. 
It would seem that. within broad safeguards. the bargaining unit and the nature of the most 
representative union can be defined according to national conditions. The question must 
therefore be asked: What are the most appropriate arrangements that would be feasible in 
New Zealand? The answer would reasonably be those that fit most easily within the present 
structures and institutions. It should be possible. with appropriate modifications. to use the 
present basis of industry-district registration as the basic unit for the most representative 
union and grant the privileges accordingly. In most cases this would be unlikely to result in 
any short-terrn changes in union organisation and even in the longer term it is likely that 
agreements within the union n1ovement would limit dramatic change. A transitional period 
where the present union was designated the most representative would ease the process of 
change considerably. 
While dran1atic changes would seem unlikely with a mature union movement. such a 
revision of the law would involve a marked departure from the present arrangements. As a 
n1inin1un1. existing unions would need to be prepared for other competing unions to operate 
within their hitherto exclusive preserve. even if only to represent the interests of their own 
members on a restricted basis. On a more fundan1entallevel. the possibility must exist of a 
challenge to a union ·s position and its representative capacity. A well organised and 
democratic union. responsive to members· needs. should however. have little to fear from such 
arrangements. 
The union n1oven1ent is in essence left with a choice between its present protected position 
and a more uncertain position but which gives much stronger guarantees (and international 
sanctions) to the concept of freedom of association. For a developed union movement the 
latter option has considerable advantages especially in the light of potential future political 
developments. The structure of trade unionism in New Zealand has. and in many respects 
continues to be. seen as a n1atter for possible political manipulation. Suggestions that unions 
be reorganised on a"plant basis. a reorganisation of major significance. is one manifestation of 
this. The essence of Convention 87 is that union organisation is a matter for workers and their 
organisations. not en1ployers or governments. 
The right to control their own affairs 
Within present industrial law. New Zealand unions face 3 major impediments to 
controlling their own affairs: (I) the ultra vires rule: (2) the controls on the membership rules. 
(3) the prescriptions on the contents and structure of the union rulebook. Of these. the first 2 
are the rnost significant. 
In a line of cases beginning in 1913. the courts have taken a particularly restrictive view of 
the ultra vires doctrine in relation to trade unions (see Mathieson. 1970 pp. 218-228).1n essence. 
registered unions have been held to have no powers beyond those set out in section 163. i.e. 
"protect or further the interests of workers engaged in any specified industry:· and then 
possibly only in relation to "industrial matters .. as defined in section 2. a section that has been 
narrowly construed (Anderson. 1979. pp. 3-17). It has. for example. been held that unions have 
no power to be involved in welfare activities or to amalgatnate with organisations outside their 
own industry. interpretations that would seem totally incompatible with article 3 (and also 
with real life). The ultra vires rule has also been used by the Registrar to justify a refusal to 
accept ntle changes that widen union activities (Department of Labour. 1985. II pp. 41-42). 
The Green Paper acknowledges these problems (Department of Labour. 1985. II pp. 52-56) 
and particularly the narrow scope of the ultra vires rule which it seems to imply could be 
widened. 
These problems are. however. relatively easy to overcome given the political will. If the 
suggestion n1ade a hove of having a new system of union incorporation was adopted it would 
he relatively si1nple to include a section defining union powers in a broad manner (cf. 
the 
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Cornpanics Act )<.)55. section 15A) lea\ing the union it elf to decide appropriate limitation~. 
The second problem. restriclions on mcrnhership clauses. could <~gain he overco1n~. at 
least legally. hy simply allowing unions to incorporate with uch con'litutions as the) sec fit 
within broad parameters set by the legislation. Such an approach \\otdd. hoWC\CI'. require a 
major attitudinal change hy the unions. ~tlthough ~tgain it could he (tnticipctted that internal 
union processes would rcstrkt the possibility of 1najor disruption. 
Finally. some attention would need to be given to the controls on internal organi ati()n of 
u n io 11 s in the Act. 1 nso 1'<1 r <ISs uc h provision~ are designed toe nsu rc tkrnocra tic control and to 
protect mem hers rights (such as Part X Ill on election i rregula ri tics) or their funds (section 1 R4 
on ~ICCOl111ts and audits) lhey arc recognised as acceptable. It is only if the controls go beyond 
this that prohlen1s arise. \Vhere controls and safeguards are prescribed it is. hO\\ever. 
preferable that abuses are checked hy judicial rather than ad1ninistrativc procedures (ILO. 
1975. pp. 21- '"'). 
In general then internal controls are acceptable so long as they do not undul) lin1it union 
activities. a point the Cornm i ttec of Experts seem to have peLi fica 11 y noted in connect ion" it h 
New Zealand (ILO. 1973. pp. XO-Rl ). 
Freedont front dissoluTion hv acl!ninistratil'e action 
. . 
It is acknowledged in the Green Paper (Oepartrnent or Labour I9X5. I p. 35) tha:t the 
deregistration provisions or the Industrial Relations ALl arc incompatihlc with Con\ention 
S7. The ILO Comn1ittee of Experts seerns to have agreed with this conclusion in a specific 
consideration of Ne\\ Zealand law {ILO. 1973. p. XI). The cornention does not. ho\\C\er. 
pro h i bit d is so 1 u t ion or u n ion s as such . o n 1) t h e n1 e l hod b) \\ h i c h t h i s is a c h i e' e d . \~1 h i 1 e the 
Committee accepts dissolution under judicial control as it regards thi!) as pro,iding 
appropriate safeguards against ahusc (para. 157) and further accepts the notion of 
sequestration of union funds (para 171). it has dearly stated that an unfeltered Ministerial 
power lO order the Lancellation of the registration of a union i~ contrai) to the COil\Cntion 
(para. l(l1 ). Sould the ultimate sanction of deregistration (or dissolution) he retained then at 
k:1st 2 c h<1 nges are n e~d~d. The present unfettered 1n in istc ria I power n ceds to be rcpl aced\\ i th 
an appropri,lte judicial pnKcdure and L'onsequently dear critcrin need to be estahli ~hed for 
justifying deregistrati<ll1. 
Two con1 n1en ts can he made in rc h1 t iun to de r~gi st ration. The first is that lh c need fori t has 
not been clearly cstahlished ~tnd moreover the cnai1ahilit) or alternative procedure~ 
(particularly contcn1pt of courts) may well nutke it unnecessary. Seconc..H). it ~hould h~ 
recognised that deregistration is h) nature an anti-uninn procedure and docs not appl) to 
cn1ployer · in any rneaningful \\cty. Indeed the mere sugge tion of corn parable po\\ers <~imed 
at employers \\Ould result in a major howl of outrage. 
Right To join federations 
The decision in Auckland Freezing 111orks JUOH1 v. 1\'ew Zealand Free:ing JVorks IAOH' 
(1951) severely restricted the rights of unions to affiliate with larger union groupings. \Vhile 
legislation has amclior,tted this position. the position is still son1ewhat uncertain. Section ll.JX 
would still seem to lirnit international affiliations and po ·sihly affiliation with organisations 
whose objects exceeded those listed in section 19R. The Green Paper acknowledgL's this 
prohlern. which could he solved hy a str<tigtforward cllnendment to the present Ia\\ 
(Department of Lahou r. 19R5. I I p. 40 ). 
Right to organise and collective bargaining. (Convention 98) 
This convention. which was a<.Jopted in 1949. has 1 Jnain purposes: to protect the right to 
?rgani e and to pron1ote collective bargaining. As convention 9R also deals\\ ith basiL rights it 
ss often closely associated with convention S7. The ILO Comrnittee of Expert ·. for example. in 
its surveys on frecdon1 of association has considered hoth conventions together (ILO. 1973: 
lLO. 1975). This does not. however. mean that the"" arc interdependent and indeed the IL() 
Cornrnittee of Experts has specifically stated this in relation to a NL·w Zeldand lll'"lli11Cnt th~ll 
Convent ion ~R La n not be rat i lied because of its close I inks to Con \'Cnt ion S7 (I L()~l97 3. p. ~P ) . 
' 
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The right to organise 
This right is protected from 2 possible sources of abuse: discrimination against individual 
workers and attempts by employers to gain domination over unions. Article 1 provides that: 
( l) Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in 
respect of their employment. 
(2) Such protection shall apply more particularly in respect of acts calculated to: 
a. make the employment of a worker subject to the condition that he shall not join a 
union or shall relinquish trade union membership; 
b. cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of union 
membership or because of participation in union activities outside working hours or. 
with the consent of the employer. within working hours. 
Present New Zealand law gives some protection. explicitly in the victimisation provisions 
of section 150 and by implication in the personal grievance procedure. 
Section 150 is not. however. as explicit as Article I and takes a fairly restrictive view of the 
form of action and range of persons who deserve protection. It seems to relate closely to 
victimisation in relation to activities within the conciliation and arbitration process rather 
than to anti-union discrimination. as such (see Szakats and Mulgan. 1985. p. 86). Section 150 
( l) (a) is also somewhat ambiguous in that it seems that it may relate only to membership of a 
formative union rather than an established one. 
It is suggested that section 150 could be amended by explicitly providing for the forms of 
discrimination in Article 1. It may also be that the remedies for dismissal need strengthening 
to ensure that a union activist cannot be .. paid orr· by compensation on dismissal by making· 
reinstatement mandatory in such cases. Such a provision would provide real protection for 
both the individual and the union. Some dismissal cases suggest that the Arbitration Court 
may not take fully into account the tensions that can arise in employer-unionist relation-
ships. 10 The need for protection greater than compensation is recognised by the Committee 
(para. 215 - 217) and has been acknowledged by the Committee of Experts: 
In view of the difficulties which exist to ensure a total and absolute guarantee against 
acts of anti-union discrimination. in a certain number of countries legislation accords more 
extensive protection to trade union representatives. who are more usually exposed to acts of 
such a nature. This special protection is particularly desirable. because in orderto be able to 
perform their trade union duties in full independence. these representatives must have the 
guarantee that they will not be prejudiced. The guarantee of such protection is also 
necessary in order to ensure that effect is given to the principle that workers· organisations 
should have the right to elect their representatives in full freedom (ILO. 1973. pp. 64-65). 
Present New Zealand law is defective in regard to the protection of union representatives 
both in scope and in remedies. Article 2 provides: 
( 1) Workers· and employers· organisations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts 
of interference by each other or each other·s agents or members in their establishment 
functioning or administration . 
(2) In particular. acts which are designed to promote the establishment of workers· 
organisations under the domination of employers· organisations. or to support workers· 
organisations by financial or other means. with the object of placing such organisations 
under the control of em players or employers· organisations. shall be deemed to constitute 
acts of interference within the meaning of this Article. 
New Zealand law does not seem to provide specific provisions that fulfil this article·s 
requirements (as the Committee seems in favour: para. 234) although in practice the system of 
union organisation probably ensures that such domination is unlikely. Nevertheless. specific 
protection is essential: particularly if there was any move towards smaller-enterprise based 
unions where such abuses are mostly likely. If the separate incorporation provisions 
suggested above were adopted. incorporation could be made subject to an independent 
certification of independence. In practical terms however. the size of the union. in particular 
the fact that it covers many employees and is financially independent. are probably the best 
safeguards. These features are retained in the most-representative provisions suggested above. 
I 0 Sec for exam pic Canterbury Hotel etc. /VOW v Lake Te/cQpo Motor Inn (1983) ACJ 911. 
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Collecti\'C! bargaining 
The second lirnb of Convention 98 is found in Arti(le 4: 
1\1ea,ures appropriate to national conditions shall he taken. \\here ncces:-,af) . to 
encountgc and promote the full development and utilisation of machiner) for \Oiuntary 
negotiation hctwecn cmpiO)'L'rs and employers· organisations and workers organisations . 
v. i th a' iew to the regulation of terms and conditions of ern ploymcnt by mean~ of collecti\ e 
agreements. 
These convention~· requiren1ents seern directed rnore tov.ards ensuring the effecti\e 
implementation of freedon1 of association than \vith a particular n1ethod of industrial 
negotiation. The Australian system is. for exan1pk. rnentioned by the Con1111ittee of Experts 
(ILO. 1973. p. 72) without adverse comn1ent. Indeed it is noted that the ystcn1 includes a 
considerable an1ount ofvoluntary negotiation hath within and outside the fornHtl systcn1. As 
the New Zealand systen1 is an a logo us to that of Australia. and now no longer stipu latcs 
compulsOJ)' i.trhitration. it would seem that it is pritnafacie in confonnity with Article 4. 
The Inajur concern of Article 4 appears to be that unions are recognised by employers and 
for the promotion of a bargaining system. In New Zealand. both issues arc dealt with by 
existing lav •. The conciliation and arbitration system both provides a bargaining systen1 and 
v~hik not compelling recognition rnakes it virtually certain . 
Workers representatives (Convention 135) 
According to its pre a n1ble. this convention is intended to su ppkn1en t the tern1s oft he anti-
union discrimination aspects of Convention 9R with tenns in respect of \\Orkers represen-
tatives. It does so by 2 basic provisions. Article I provides: 
\\'orkers· representati,es in the undertaking shall enjoy effective protection again~t an} 
act prejudicial to them. including di~missal base~..! on their status or activities a" a \\Orkers· 
representative or on union memhcrship or rwrticip<ttion in union activitie". in ~o far Hs the) 
41Ct in conformit) \\ith cxi...,ting Ia\\~ or collccti\c agreements or other jointl) agreed 
a rra ngc men ts. 
Article 2 then provides that representatives be provided with the facilities needed to 
perform their function: 
(1) Such facilities in the undertaking hall be afforded to worker~· representatives as n1ay he 
appropriate in order to enable the1n to can)' out their functions pron1ptly and efficient}). 
(2) In this connection. account shall he taken oft he characteristics of the indu trial relations 
systen1 of the counti)' and the needs. size and capabilties of the undertaking concerned. 
(3) The granting of such facilities sha II not in1 pair the efficient operation of the undertaking 
concerned. 
\Vorkers· representatives includes union representative~ but also representative "freely 
elected .. by the workers in the undertaking and who:sc functions do not include activities 
"recognised as the exclusive prerogative of trade union ··(Article 3). As the latter categol)' is 
not found in New Zealand ~1t rresent. the provisions of Article 5 designed to ensure that such 
representatives do not unJenninc trade unions. i~ not relevant. 
The New Zealand Govern mcn(s response to Convention 135 (AJ HR. 1973. Paper A7 A pp. 
2-3) contains only one serious objection lo ratification which relates to Article 2. This is that 
present law does not provide for ··appropriate facilities" to be afforded. a terrn that is taken to 
include at lea .. J interviewing space. furniture and possibly corre pondence facilities. It is 
recognised that such facilities are often provided in praclice but it is argued that legislation 
would ··cut across accepted lines of rcsponsihiliti·. This argun1ent seen1s son1ewhat pedantic 
given the n1initnal nature of the facilities envisaged and the strong general tendency for 
legislative intervention in industrial relations. h is suggested that legislation to in1plen1ent 
Article 2 would be. at worst. a n1inirnal in1position on en1ploycrs and. in light of the con1n1ents 
on the tripartite nature of lLO conventions. should be welcon1ecl. This is particularly so if 
faci H tics areal ready widespread in practice. The .. faci 1 i ty .. of a union ·s access to its n1e1n hers is 
provided in section 96. 
The Governn1ent"s con1n1ents suggest that set:tion 150 already covers the re4uiren1ents of 
• 
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Article I. It has been suggested above. however. that this section needs strengthening and the 
san1e con1ment applies in relation to this convention. The requirements of ··effective .. 
protection in particular needs attention. To summarise. Convention 135 could be ratified after 
. rninor legal changes. changes that could most appropriately take place within the present 
• 
revtew. 
Promotion of collective bargaining (Convention 154) 
The preamble to this convention states that .. it is desirable to make greater efforts to 
achieve the objectives" of a number of conventions and recommendations including 
Conventions 87 and 98. This object is to be achieved by promoting both the subject matter and 
the process of collective bargaining. That the convention is regarded as of more than usual 
significance can perhaps be implied from the implementation provision (Article 4) which. 
contrary to normal practice. requires implementation by legislation should it not be given 
effect by other n1eans. 
The 2 fundamental provisions are Article I which defines collective bargaining in terms of 
both a process and its subject matter: 
For the purpose of this Convention the term "collective bargaining"' extends to all 
negotiations which take place between an employer. a group of employers or one or more 
employers organisations. on the one hand and one or more workers· organisations. on the 
other. for-
(a) determining working conditions and terms of employment: and/or 
(b) regulating relations between employers and workers: and/or 
(c) regulating relations between employers or their organisations and workers· organisa-
tion or workers· organisations: 
and article 5 which covers the measures that are to be taken to promote bargaining. The 
measures can be adapted to national conditions but should have the following aims: (a) 
collective bargaining should be made possible for all employers and all groups of workers in 
the branches of activity covered by the Convention: (b) collective bargaining should be 
progressively extended to all matters covered by subparagraphs (a). (b) and (c) of Article 2 of 
the Convention: (c) the establishment of rules of procedure agreed between employers· and 
workers· organisations should be encouraged: (d) collective bargaining should not be 
harnpered by the absence of rules governing the procedure to be used or by the inadequacy or 
inappropriateness of such rules: (e) bodies and procedures for the settlement of labour 
disputes should be so conceived as to contribute to the promotion of collective bargaining. 
The Ne\\' Zealand Government has indicated that it will not ratify this convention (AJHR. 
1982. Paper A 7. p. 51). There seem to be 2 reasons forth is. The first is that the matters specified 
in Article 2 go beyond those included within the definition of ""industrial matters .. in the 
Industrial Relations Act. This view is taken because of the restrictive interpretation that has 
been given to this ph rase (see Anderson. 1979. pp. 3-17 ). It is suggested that this problem 
shoul9 properly be overcome by ensuring that ··industrial matters .. is given a wider and more 
natural interpretation. not by refusing to ratify the convention. The argument that defects in 
New Zealand law are a good reason for refusing to ratify a convention is hardly meritorious. 
The Green Paper has. however. recognised that the present interpretation of ""industrial 
matters" n1ay be unduly · restrictive (Department of Labour. 1985. II pp. 102-103) and 
presutnably in1plics that reforn1 is required. Any reform should take account of Article l of 
this convention. 
The second reason advanced is unclear but it seems to relate a belief that the requirements 
of Article 4 (on in1plernentation) involve a need to legislate ••to require bargaining on matters 
which are covered by the Convention". The Government regards this as incompatible with its 
policy of allowing the parties to evolve for themselves the matters on which they wish to 
negotiate. This objection seems ill-founded. The convention merely states. when defining 
collective bargaining. that the terrn .. extends to all negotiations . .. for .. the matters listed. This 
does not seem to require them all to be bargained for. While the implementation of the 
convention would make bargaining on these matters possible (or permissible) it would not 
make it mandatory. This objection would consequently seem to lack substance. 
While the conventions title refers to ··collective bargaining" it would seem tbat 
that conciliation and arbitration systems come within its scope. Article 6 
rts to 
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convention does not preclude the openrtion of systen1s in which collective bargaining takes 
place within the fratnework of conciliation and arbitration. 
Conclusion 
A reviC\-'' of those international labour standards that relate to the Green Paper pro\eS to 
be a useful and salutory exercise. The conventions surveyed in this paper provide wh<tt the 
11. .. 0 regards as basic 1ninirnum standards and safeguards for the operation of an industrial 
relations systen1. That New Zealand has yet to ratify any of these convention~ ~hould be seen 
as a 1natter of considerable concern. This paper has argued that. in the cases of Convention 98 . 
135 and 154. there is no substantial barrier to ratification. There are areas where Ne\\ Zealand 
law and practice docs not confon11 to these convention but these arc 1ninor and could ea ily 
be remedied. The problen1s arc not ones of substance but cases where Ne"' Zealand law i 
inadequate and fails to tneet minin1un1 international standard . 
If New Zealand takes its obligations to the ILO seriously. it should act to re1nedy these 
matters. The reasons governtnent give~ for not ratifying often seen1 to be excuses for inaction 
rather than reasoned ohjcctions to the principles of the conventions. It should he a funclion of 
governtnent to actively encourage ratification where possibk and to lead unions and 
employers tO\\arcls this goal. An impression is given. however. that I L<) nHtttcrs are not given a 
particularly high priority either by government or the other parties. The general revie\\' of 
industrial relations begun with the Green Paper is an opportunity to change these attitudes 
and to give proper weight to international standards. both con\cntions and recomtnendation . 
The failure to ratify convention R7 i perhaps n1ore undcrstandahle as there are 
considerable technical and practical probktns to be overcon1e before conforn1it) could be 
guaranteed. It i suggested abo\'c that theke are not insurmountable and that the present 
revie\\ rnay well be the tin1e to face up to them . However. there al o is a trong po ~sibilit) that 
the essential nature and purpose ofConvention 87 is neither appreciated or accepted. Its ba ic 
philosophy is that workers should be able to form and control their own organisation!) without 
interference. Legislation such as the Fishing Industry (Union Coverage) Act and suggestions 
of union restructuring to suit government and etnployer policies would scern to indicate 
clC(trly that this basic philusophy is yet lll be fully accepted in New zc,dand. COll1Jl11;!11tS that 
such conventions are aimed only at third world dictatorships. (IS have been made. arc at hcst 
arrogant and <:tt heart probably show a lack or syn1pathy for the Conventions purposes. 
The ILO Corntnittee of Experts has staled (ILO. 1973. p. R3) that Conventions R7 and qg: 
. .. hclong to the catego!) of fLO instruml!nh de!:ligned to promote and maintain certain 
fundamental human rights aimed at safeguarding man·s freedom. equal it) and dignit) . A':, 
~.ouch. they figure among those Cotnention~ v.hich hcnc ohtaincd the largest numher of 
ratifications. 
That New Zealand is not among this nurnher should he a 1nattcr of major concern for a 
country that prides itself on its liberal and dernocratic sy tc1n of governn1ent. 
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